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In many democratic countries, the timing of elections is flexible. We explore this
potentially valuable option using insights from option pricing in finance.
The paper offers three main contributions on this problem. First, we derive a
rationally-based mean-reverting political support process for the parties, assuming
that politically heterogeneous voters continuously learn over time about evolving
party fortunes. We solve for the long-run density for this process and derive the
polling process from it by adding polling noise.
Second, we explore optimal timing using the political support process. The in-
cumbent sees its poll support, and must call an election within five years of the last
election to maximize its expected total time in office. This resembles the optimal
exercise rule for an American financial option. This option is recursive, and the
waiting and stopping values subtly interact. We prove the existence of the optimal
exercise rule in this setting, and show that the expected longevity is a convex-then-
concave function of the political support. Our model is tractable enough that we can
analytically derive how the exercise rule responds to parametric shifts.
We calibrate our model to the Labour-Tory rivalry in the U.K., with polling data
from 1943-2005 and the 16 elections after 1945. Excluding three elections essen-
tially forced by weak governments, our maximizing story quite well explains when
the elections were called, and beats simple linear regressions. We also measure the
value of election options, finding that over the long run they should more than double
the expected time in power of a fixed term electoral cycle.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Timing lies at the heart of many economic decisions, and the option to choose when to
act often has immense value. This has been the subject of a large literature in economics,
most especially in finance. Building on the insights from finance about option pricing,
this paper instead revisits a classic political economy question: optimal electoral timing.
In a key thread of a parliamentary democracy’s fabric, the incumbent often has flex-
ibility in choosing when it faces the electorate. We first develop a theoretical model of
the decision problem facing the government in deciding when to call an election. We
then proceed to illustrate it using the post-WWII experience of the United Kingdom. A
newly elected government there must call an election within five years, but generally acts
in advance of this binding terminal constraint. While the tradition is to call the election
around the four year mark, the actual exercise time has ranged from six to sixty months.
In theory, we find that optimally exercising this option has tremendous value there, more
than doubling the expected time in power versus running the term out. And in practice, it
offers insights into the electoral success of the Conservatives (simply: the Tories).
For some context, imagine a government in power that sees its monthly standing in
the polls, and must choose to call an election before its mandate expires. Suppose that
an encouraging confluence of events sees its standing surging by 8%. Should it call a
snap election now? Obviously, this depends on a host of considerations, ranging from
the practical (perhaps it must first pass a budget) to the sociological (maybe the electorate
will punish it for “opportunism”). We focus rigorously on just one consideration, as we
assume that the government simply wishes to maximize its expected total time in power,
and find that this has significant explanatory power on when elections have been called.
Naturally, the government should call election(i) the closer to the end of the term,
and(ii) the higher its political support. To characterize this tradeoff, we draw the analogy
of the electoral timing choice to the optimal exercise time of an American option — i.e.
the right to buy or sell a stock in a fixed window of time at a moment of one’s choosing.
Yet the theory underlying our story is harder in several dimensions. First, an election is
not at all like an asset sale: An investor choosing to exercise a financial option early need
not ever think beyond its maximum term. On the other hand, a government that “sells its
mandate” early in an election thereafter wins it back if it succeeds; this “renewal option”
is forward-looking over an infinite horizon. Second, asset prices are perfectly observed,
while a government only sees a noisy signal of its standing from the polls. Third, the
stochastic process of asset prices is well-developed and tractable (geometric Brownian
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motion), but there exists no similar model of the popular standing of a government.
We begin by addressing this last omission first. Our model is tractable and captures
three key features of the political process in a left-right rivalry: voter heterogeneity, the
fickle fortunes of political parties, and the continuous onslaught of media information.
We assume an immense number of politically heterogeneous voters wish to vote for
the “best governing party”. This best party is assumed unobserved by all. To wit, right
and left wing supporters alike wish to vote Tory if Labour is a mess; however, right is
far more readily convinced to vote Tory than is left. In other words, ordinal preferences
coincide — i.e. all prefer the best party — but cardinal preferences diverge. This blend
not only subsumes political ideologues for extreme cardinal preferences, but also captures
the fact that the intensity of political allegiances differs across voters.
Next, towards a political ebb and flow, we assume that the best party periodically
and randomly changes according to a Markov process. Voters continuously learn over
time about this unobserved Markovian state from the news media. This is achieved in
our model with a simple Bayesian device: Voters constantly observe the outcome of a
Brownian motion with uncertain drift. This drift represents the best party — high when
the right party is best, say, and low when the left party is. This yields in Lemma 1 a simple
continuous time stochastic process for thepolitical slant, the current posterior chance that
the right is the best party. As the best party periodically switches,t is stochastic process is
mean-reverting.Its long-run distribution is so well-behaved that we are able to precisely
compute it (Lemma 3). Once we assume an exponential distribution over the strength of
political beliefs, the political slant equals the fraction of voters that support it (Lemma 4).
This transforms our Bayesian story into a law of motion for political support. At the end
of this exercise,a party’s support reflects political leanings, and yet evolves in a Bayes-
rational fashion to reflect new information.We have not found another rationally-derived
support process. Ours is so tractable that it should prove useful in future work.
This brings us to our second contribution, closer to finance. The government’s timing
decision is analogous to the optimal exercise time of an American option. The government
continuously entertains a waiting value depending on the political slant and time left, and
stops when it coincides with a slant-dependent stopping value. It calls an election when
its political standing first hits a nonlinear stopping barrier. Unlike the usual optimal stop-
ping exercises in economics, our stopping value is recursively defined in terms of future
waiting values. We assume that when calling an election, the process further evolves dur-
ing a campaign period delay, rendering the outcome uncertain. Also, the government only
2
has access to noisy polling data, and does not know its actual support. Not surprisingly,
as the optimal exercise time for the finite horizon American put option is not analytically
known, our harder optimization problem can only be found numerically. Still, we prove
existence of the solution of this recursive option (Proposition 2), and characterize it by
variational equations (Proposition 3). We show that the expected longevity is a convex-
then-concave function of the support. We also analytically study how the optimal strategy
responds to parametric shifts. Elections, eg., tend to be later with more volatile political
support. We analytically motivate many other comparative statics.
Our third contribution is an empirical test of our timing model, and our finding that
timing matters, i.e., the option is valuable. We motivate the relevance in two ways. For
a bigger quick motivational picture, we seek a large cross section of similar two party
democracies that have been around a long time. Since democracy is so young, we choose
the provinces of Canada and states of the USA. We find that provincial governments (with
flexible electoral timing) have lasted significantly (50%) more than the state governors.
To say anything stronger, our model must be calibrated to a specific case.
We next calibrate our polling process to the U.K., because it is the parliamentary
democracy with the longest time series of voting intention polls. Moreover, it has just two
serious parties. We use public polling data from 1943–2005 and the seventeen elections
1945–2005, and assume a left-right rivalry between Labour and Tory.1 We estimate the
polling process parameters from the polling data: They are statistically significant, and
do not statistically depend on whether an election campaign is in progress.
We use the estimated polling process parameters to solve for the optimal election
times. We compare the predicted and realized election times. With just one explanatory
variable apart from the elapse time, our theory explains 43% of the variation in the timing
decisions of governmentsnot troubled by weak or minority governments. Further, the
theoretical and actual election decisions have correlation coefficient 0.65. This fit augurs
in favor of our main thesis that governments call elections to maximize the expected time
in power, using information summarized by the public polling process.
Our paper then offers a useful normative message. The freedom to optimally time
the next election clearly confers upon an incumbent government an advantage unavail-
able in fixed election cycle regimes. For instance, one can postpone the election until
the economy is looking up. Our model can quantify the long-run average magnitude of
this advantage. We find that election options have great value, more than doubling the
1We finally test our model by using the 16 elections after World War II since, as will be seen later, the
time difference between elections is one factor in the election timing and, thus, we lose one observation.
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expected time in power in the U.K. If the U.K. implemented a fixed electoral cycle with
four year terms, then the expected duration in power would fall by a factor of more than
three for Labour (from 36 to 10 years), and by slightly more than two for Tory (from 17
to 7 years). Flexible terms on average benefit the more popular party more than the less
popular party. Constitutional designers should be aware of the magnitude of this differen-
tial effect in choosing amongst fixed and flexible electoral terms. We show that the option
is worth twenty-four years for Labour and only eight for Tory.
Literature Review. Balke (1990) showed that majority governments trade off current
time in power against uncertain future time in their election timing decisions. Following
on this observation, Lesmono, Tonkes, and Burrage (2003) is the closest paper to ours.
They also analogize election timing to American option theory.2 In contrast to their paper,
our underlying political support process is different, which should come as no surprise
as we derive it from a Bayesian learning foundation. Their model’s implied political
support process mean reverts about 1/2 (i.e., the long-run mean is fixed to 1/2), it does not
consider polling error, and their model is not well-defined if the support process has a high
volatility. Further, we prove the existence of the solution, characterize the value function
and the optimal policy by using variational equations, and give comparative statics. We
also test empirically how well the model explains the realized elections times.
Diermeier and Merlo (2000) is an equilibrium model of electoral timing. They assume
that many types of governments (like minority) can form, early elections can happen, and
that some governments are less stable than others. We ignore complications like minority
governments and coalitions, in favour of a focused attack on the electoral timing problem.
There is a large and less related literature on timing and political business cycles.3
For instance, Palmer (2000) finds that macroeconomic performance and political context
both affect election timing. Better economic indicators lead to early elections. While
not inconsistent with our approach, we argue that better economic indicators intuitively
improve a government’s standing in the polls, andtherebylead to earlier elections. Our
governments take the polling process as a given, and optimize against it.
Our paper relates to work on sequential optimal stopping problems in finance and
elsewhere. Sequential American options are studied in optimal harvesting problems (e.g.
2This paper was unavailable when our precursor, Davydov and Smith (2000), was written.
3See also Ellis and Thoma (1991), Kayser (2005b), and Chowdhury (1993). Kayser (2005a) derives a
model to predict the degree of opportunistic election timing and manipulation under alternate institutional
structures. Smith (1996) considers election timing with strategic signalling by assuming that the choice of
election date reveals information about the government.
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Alvarez and Shepp (1998)), executive options with the so-called “reload” feature (e.g.
Dybvig and Loewenstein (2003)), mortgage refinancing (e.g. Hurst and Stafford (2004)),
and firms’ optimal recapitalization (e.g. Peura and Keppo (2005)). Putting aside two other
difficulties of our option — measurement error and election delay4 — we believe that ours
is the first renewable American option studied with a finite exercise time horizon. This
creates a nonstationary decision rule over time, and is the source of interest in this paper.
We solve for the nonlinear exercise boundary for the electoral timing problem.
Structure of the Paper. In Section 2, we motivate our paper, showing that this electoral
flexibility has been useful in practice. Section 3 describes the model, and§4 the theoretical
election timing results. In§5, we estimate the model parameters with British polling data.
We then test the model in§6 with post-war support levels at the election times. In§7, we
price the electoral option and§8 concludes. Appendix A gathers analytical derivations,
while Appendix B describes the numerical solution of the optimal stopping problem.
2 THE ELECTORAL TIMING OPTION IN HISTORY
This section is purely motivational. As already outlined, the United Kingdom has flexible
electoral terms, a long polling series, and a long two party alternation. This makes it an
ideal candidate for exploring the electoral timing option. However, since we claim that
the timing option has value, it would be helpful to see this evidenced in a wider cross-
section drawn from other countries with both fixed and flexible electoral terms. Alas,
democracy is young, and the democratic countries of the world are diverse. Some are de
facto one-party states (like Mexico or Japan), about which any electoral theory must be
silent. Many are multi-party states where electoral streaks are harder to maintain.
To address this heterogeneity, we explore the national and state or provincial govern-
ments of Canada and the U.S.A.5 In Canada, the winner is the party supplying the prime
minister or premiers, and for the U.S.A., we restricted attention to the presidency and the
governorships. Our theory also assumes an easy information flow to the electorate about
the merits of the competing parties. We thus begin with the first regime shift after 1930
4Sanders (2003) analyzes polling error, and Alvarez and Keppo (2001) study the effect of delays.
5Gubernatorial term limits (e.g. www.termlimits.org/CurrentInfo/StateTL/gubernatorial.html) apply
in several states. About 10% of all governorships after 1930 ended due to the term limits. The estimated
probability that the ruling party changes after the term limit is active is 0.58 and 0.44 when the term limit
is not active. With 5% significance level we cannot reject the hypothesis that these estimates are the same.
Therefore, we ignore the term limits here.
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(so that a shift must exist), and for which power has alternated between just two parties.6
Canada became a fully autonomous country in 1931, which makes this a focal starting
decade. Also, if we choose earlier years, the parties have different names.
For each state, province, or country, we ask how many consecutive years the same
government is in power. Delaware, eg., had its first post-1930 change of power in 1967;
the government parties then changed power in 1971, 1987, 1991, and 1999. This yields
five “ruling periods” over 1967–2005, or an average duration of38/5 = 7.6 years, or 1.9
terms. Altogether, we have 46 data points for the USA, and six for Canada. We find that
the average government duration is 8.19 years for the U.S.A. and 15.43 for Canada —
in other words, 2.05 four year terms for the U.S.A. and 3.09 five year terms for Canada.
Using a pooledt-test, we find that = 2.58; we can confidently reject the hypothesis of
equal mean numbers of terms. Clearly, the electoral timing option has significant value.7,8
We now try to precisely analyze this option, and estimate, and then test it for the U.K.
3 THE DYNAMIC POLITICAL PROCESS
A. The Changing Political State. An underlying and uncertain state variable describes
the best political party for the country. This state variable is unobservable, randomly
switching between leftL and rightR. Two big parties, denoted also byL andR, win all
elections.9 PartyL,R is best in the unobservedpolitical stateθ = L,R, respectively.
The state is random and persistent. Specifically, it follows an exogenous Poisson
stochastic process, intuitively governed by the evolution of the political and economic
situation. The state switches fromθ = L,R in a time interval of length∆t with chance
λθ∆t > 0. Without a changing political state, the voters would eventually discern the true
state via the information process below, and an optimal ruling party would emerge.
6The first criterion just eliminates the Democratic bastion of Georgia. The latter prunes Connecticut,
Maine, Minnesota, and Oregon, and the provinces of B.C., Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario, and Quebec.
7A private member’s motion was introduced into Canada’s House of Commons in 2004 to shift the
country towards fixed four year terms. Commenting on election timing, the bill’s sponsor said anyone in
power would “call the election in the most self-serving moment for ourselves and you’d be a fool not to.”
The Canadian provinces of B.C. and Ontario have recently informally changed to fixed four year terms.
8The Canadian province of Quebec had a separatist government from 1976–1999. It seemed agreed that
a majority in a referendum would allow the provincial government to initiate political separation from the
rest of Canada. Trying to best time this vote using polling data proved an important activity, and resulted in
pro-separation votes just shy of 40% and 50% in the referenda called in 1980 and 1990.
9Our approach is flexible extends to any number of parties, and in fact, Davydov and Smith (2000)
considered three. To avoid the complexity of matrices, we simply allow two here.
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B. The Information Process. The political stateθ(t) is unobservable. We develop a
tractable stylized “informational representative agent” voter model of the unobservedθ.
We assume a continuum[0, 1] of voters, and focus only on big partyB-voters. While
the number ofB-voters could be stochastic, this would not matter since only proportions
matter. Voters share a common understanding — apolitical slant— p(t) = P [θ(t) = R]
that the optimal party isR. The electorate can be viewed as “right-leaning” exactly when
p(t) > 0.5. From this, voters can compute their expected utility from voting forL r R.
Voters freely learn about the political state by perusing the newspaper, watching tele-
vision, and listening to radio. We assume that news revelation is a continuously unfolding
process of constant intensity. Such a non-lumpy stationary news process is tractably and
optimally summarized by assuming aGaussian public information processξ in continu-
ous time: namely, the stochastic differential equationdξ(t)=βθ(t)dt+γdZ(t), whereZ(t)
is a Wiener process andβR > βL.10 More concretely, in stateθ, in any∆t time interval,
∆ξ(t) is normally distributed, with meanβθ∆t, varianceγ2∆t, and signals conditionally
independent of other times. It is obvious that informationξ(·) is sufficient for beliefs. But
the reverse is true too: The political slant processp(·) is sufficient for informationξ(·).
Lemma 1 (Dynamics) The political slantp(t) given signalξ(t) obeys Bayes rule:
dp(t) = a(b− p(t))dt + σp(t)(1− p(t))dW (t), (1)
wherea = λL+λR >0, 0<b=λL/a<1, σ = (βR−βL)/γ > 0, for a Wiener processW .
Proof:11 The state isθ(t) = L and switches toθ(t + dt) = R with chance(1−p(t))λLdt,
while θ(t)=R=θ(t+dt) with chancep(t)(1−λRdt). The drift is then the expected new
posterior belief thatθ(t + dt) = R less the old one, or:
E[dp(t)] = E[p(t+dt)]−p(t) = (1−p(t))λLdt+p(t)(1−λRdt)−p(t) = a(b−p(t))dt
The variance termσp(t)(1 − p(t)) is formally derived in Theorem 9.1 of Liptser and
Shiryayev (1977), who show thatσ = (βR − βL)/γ, the signal-to-noise ratio. Bolton and
Harris (1999) offer an intuitive derivation by Bayes rule, yielding the first order terms:
p(t + ∆)− p(t) = p(t)P (∆ξ(t)|R)
p(t)P (∆ξ(t)|R) + (1− p(t))P (∆ξ(t)|L) − p(t) ∝ p(t)(1− p(t))
10Moscarini and Smith (2001) prove this nice property of the observation process.
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Figure 1: The Long Run Density of the Political Slantp in the U.K. The estimated
parameters area = 1.59, b = 0.47, σ = 0.35. The chance thatL wins isP (p ≤ 0.5) = 75%.
Lemma 2 (Future Beliefs) If the political slant starts atp, then the expectation ofp(t) is
m(p, t) = e−atp+(1−e−at)b. The variance ofp(t) increases in the diffusion coefficientσ.
Proof: The formula for the meanm(p, t) obtains just as if the political slant process was
noiseless, since it is an expectation, and the noise drops out: Thus, solve the differential
equationṗ(t) = a(b− p(t)). The comparative static inσ is proved in Appendix A.1.¤
Parametersa andb describe the unobserved political dynamics, whileσ summarizes
the quality of the information process. The more revealing is the public information
processξ(t) — as measured by the “signal-to-noise ratio”(βR − βL)/γ — the more
volatile are public beliefs. The parametera captures thespeed of convergencetowards
the meanb. For example, starting atp = 0, the expected slant after 3 years lies within
1% of the meanb, by Lemma 2 for the estimated U.K. parametera = 1.59 (see§5.C).
This fast mean reversion speed will later mean that parties do not have to proceed in an
extremely far-sighted manner, since winning big is not much better than winning small.
A particularly convenient property of this political slant process is that its long-run
density is analytically quite tractable, as we now assert (and prove in the Appendix).
Lemma 3 (The Long Run Density) Assumeσ2 >0. Then the political slant processp(t)

















Figure 1 depicts the long run density for the U.K. parameters estimated in§5.C. Since





p = 1p = 0 u/(u+v)
Figure 2: A Voter’s Preferences. The figure schematically depicts a typical voter’s utility
maximization: he votes forL if p < u/(u+v), the cross-over level, and otherwise he votes forR.
show that not all densities of the form (2) are hill-shaped. Rather, the densityψ(p) is
U-shaped for high belief variancesσ. For then, state switches quickly become known,
and the political slant spends most of its time near 0 or 1. We have found that this is not
true for the U.K. Also, since the estimatedb < 0.5 for the U.K, the process favorsL —
on average,L is aheadP (p ≤ 0.5) = 75% of the time. So the U.K. enjoys a left-slant.
C. Preference Heterogeneity. Voters agree on the best party in each state, but — un-
certain of the political state — differ in their preference strength. Some are more willing
to err on the side of left, and some right. A type-(u, v) voter has (cardinal) utility 0 if
the wrong party is elected, utilityu > 0 if L is rightly elected, and utilityv > 0 if R is
rightly elected. He earns expected payoff[1−p(t)]u from votingL, andp(t)v fromR (see
Figure 2). A far-sighted voter might rationally anticipate the mean reversion of the state
and vote against his immediate preferences. We ignore such higher order rationalizations,
assuming that voters chooseR if p(t) > u/(u + v) andL if p(t) < u/(u + v). So a voter
becomes more left-leaning (or right leaning) asu/v → ∞ (or 0), and in the limit, never
votesR (or L). This framework subsumes doctrinaire voters as a special case.
Lemma 4 (Political Slants Become Electoral Support)If preference parametersu and
v are independently and identically distributed across voters, and they have a common
exponential density, thenp(t) is the fraction of voters for partyR in any election at.
Proof: The fraction ofB-voters supporting partyR is the total fraction of the parameters

















The exponential distribution ideally captures the fact that extreme preferences are very
rare. But its primary benefit is that it produces a tractable theory for whicht e stochastic
process of support for the right partyR exactly coincides with the political slantp.
Proposition 1 (Dynamics) The process(1) gives the electoral support dynamics forR.
This result is key to the analytic and empirical tractability of our model. In other words,
we now have a Bayesian learning-based law of motion (1) for the support of the parties.
4 OPTIMAL ELECTORAL TIMING
4.1 The Stopping and Waiting Values for the Timing Model
We assume that the government seeks to maximize the expected total time in powerin the
current streak.One might think of this as the objective of the Prime Minister, since he
usually is not around after falling from power. Alternatively, it is hard for a government to
think beyond the current streak, since it is not able to affect the timing of an election for
many years to come. But as it turns out, the difference between winning big and small is
so negligible that concern for elections long after one is defeated has essentially no effect
on electoral timing. The government opts whether to call an election or not, weighing the
cost of losing the rest of the current term with an earlier election against the benefits of
a higher re-election chance. After any election, the next must be called withinT years.
Once called, a fixedelay timeδ > 0 passes during the campaign.
The decision to call an election is an optimal stopping exercise. The stopping time
τ is a function of the remaining time until the next electionT − t and the political slant
p(t). When the ruling partyi follows an optimal strategy, we denote byF i(p, t) its ex-
pected time in power at timet, and its expected time in poweronce an election is called
Ωi(p). (We drop the superscript whenever possible.) These are the dynamic programming
waiting andstopping values, and each admits an expression in terms of the other.
If party i wins when the political slant isp, then it enjoys an expected waiting value
F i(p, 0). As the processp(t) is continuous, we assume thatFR(p, 0) = 0 for all p < 1/2,
andFL(p, 0) = 0 for all p > 1/2. In other words, partyR is in power, and so enjoys a
durationFR(p, 0) > 0 iff the p process starts out above1/2. The payoffs at the momentτ
the election is called areΩ(p(τ)), for the recursively defined function:















Figure 3: Numerical Waiting and Stopping ValuesFR and ΩR for the U.K. ΩR(p)
is the solid curve. From top to bottom, dotted lines are the numerically-computed waiting value
functionsFR(p, 0+), FR(p, 1), FR(p, 2), FR(p, 3), andFR(p, 4). The expected time in power
once electedFR(p, 0+) is the limit ast ↓ 0 of FR(p, t) by (3), and so is continuous inp. It is
only slightly increasing in the current support. The optimizing partyR does not call an election
for each timet thatFR(p, t) > ΩR(p), the stopping value.In a wonderful numerical illustration
of smooth pasting, observe how eachFR(p, t) is tangent toΩR(p) at each timet.
Since the stopping value is defined recursively, the option exercise is greatly enriched.
The value of a standard put or call option is continuous in the underlying price. Thus,
the option is not worth much when the option is only slightly “in the money” at the
expiration date. By contrast, with an election, a single vote can separate the glory of
victory from the sting of defeat: Landing slightly “in the money” is discontinuously better
than slightly “out of the money”. In other words,Ω includes abinary optionin (2) paying
at maturity the “asset or nothing” (the value of the underlying asset if it expires ) — here,
payingF or zero. AsΩ involves no optimal timing exercise, it is a “European option”.
Easily, since a government has the option of running out its full term, this is a lower
bound on its longevity:F (p, t) ≥ T − t. Forward-looking behavior generally entails an
earlier election, since we care about the expected valueΩ(p) once the election is called.12
Since this is the sum of the time until the election and the continuation value, we have:
F (p, t) = sup
t≤τ≤T
Ep(t)=p [τ − t + Ω(p(τ))] (3)
By recursive equations(2) and (3), F (p, t) is then an American option on the binary
12Maximizing the expected time in power corresponds to a zero interest rate, since a day now is worth
a day later (Smith, 1997). We do not consider discounting, since it adds little, and we have no justifiable
interest rate. Also, discounting would decrease the expected value and postpone elections because the utility
from the future falls. This pushes barriers away from realized political support levels (see Figure6).
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European optionΩ, i.e., it is an option on an option.In the appendix, we argue by
recursive means that a solution exists to these stopping and continuation values.
Proposition 2 (Existence)There exists a continuous, smooth, and monotone solution
Ωi, F i to equations(2)–(3) whereFR(p, t), ΩR(p) rise inp, andFL(p, t), ΩL(p) fall in p.
Let us next parse the waiting value intoF (p, t) = Γ(p, t)+Ω(p), whereΓ(p, t) ≥ 0 is
the time valueof the electoral option. A standard American option is more valuable with
a longer exercise time horizon, as it is optimized over a larger domain. This holds here:
Lemma 5 (More Time Helps) The waiting valueF (p, t) and the time valueΓ(p, t) both
fall in the elapse timet, and therefore rise in the horizonT .
To say anything more definite about the option values, we must exploit the stochastic
process of beliefs. Define theexpected driftof the waiting valueAF as follows: The
expected changeAF (p, t)dt of the waiting valueF (p, t) in [t, t + dt] is given by
AF (p, t) = Ft(p, t) + Fp(p, t)a(b− p) + 12Fpp(p, t)σ2p2(1− p)2 (4)
Intuitively, F falls in t by Ftdt; the political slant drift movesF by Fpdp = Fpa(b− p)dt,






2p2(1−p)2dt. This final Ito term reflects
that volatility matters whenF is nonlinear, improving option values whenFpp > 0.
Next we analyze the optimal electoral exercise strategy of the American option.
Proposition 3 (Optimality) The best election time for partyi = L,R is the first timeτ
beforeT such thatF (p(τ), τ)=Ω(p(τ)). Also, for all(p, t) ∈ (0, 1)× (0, T ), we have:
(a) Calling an election is always an option: F (p, t) ≥ Ω(p)
(b) The value is expected to fall daily by at least one day:1 +AF (p, t) ≤ 0,
where for each political slantp and timet, one of the inequalities(a) or (b) is tight.
These are standard variational inequalities (see e.g. Øksendal, 1998) for the value(3),
assuming that Ito’s Lemma applies. They jointly imply that when waiting is called for
because it is better than stopping, orF (p, t) > Ω(p), the unit flow utility balances the
expected time lost in officeAF (p, t) = −1. Here, the waiting valueF (p, t) falls (see
Figure 3) a day for every day in office until the election is called (whilet < τ ). Once
the waiting and continuation values coincide,F = Ω, further delay hurts. From then
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Figure 4:Electoral Timing for Party R. The figure schematically depicts the electoral option
exercise problem facing partyR. It calls an election when the political slantp(t) hits the election
barrierp̄R(t). Two paths forp(t) are shown, with resulting election timesτ ′ andτ ′′.
schematically illustrates the situation for the ruling partyR. By complementary slackness,
the government either waits or calls an election, i.e., one of inequalities(a) or (b) is tight.
Assumet < T . Let theoptimal stopping barrier̄pR(t) be the time-dependent least
solutionp to FR(p, t) = ΩR(p), andp̄L(t) the maximum solutionp to FL(p, t) = ΩL(p).
Corollary 1 (Optimal Election Barriers) Assume that the electoral term is not over.
(a) PartyR delays an election iffp(t) < p̄R(t) and partyL delays iffp(t) > p̄L(t).
(b) The stopping barrier̄pR(t) falls in time, while the barrier̄pL(t) rises.
Proof: Along the barrier,F i = Ωi, and thus the time value vanishes:Γi ≡ F i − Ωi = 0.
Total differentiation yieldsdΓ = Γpdp̄i(t) + Γitdt = 0 along the barrier. Also, since
the time value is positive away from the barriers and vanishes along each barrier, ap-
proaching it horizontally tells us thatΓit < 0. Next, approaching them vertically yields
ΓRp (p̄
R(t), t) < 0 andΓLp (p̄
L(t), t) > 0. Altogether, we havedp̄R(t) < 0 < dp̄L(t). ¤
4.2 The Expected Time in Power
A. Analytical Results. Stock option values are convex in the underlying price, simply
because more risk pushes weight into the exercise tail. This convenient property holds for
the election option:
Lemma 6 (The Waiting Value) The waiting valueFR(p, t) is a convex function of the
political slantp for p < p̄R(t), whereasFL(p, t) is convex inp for p > p̄L(t).
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The logic follows from insights in Bayesian learning (see Easley and Kiefer, 1988).
First, because it can be ignored, information must have nonnegative value — raising
the expected time in power. But information also causes a mean-preserving spread in
beliefsp, since posterior beliefs are riskier than priors (by the law of iterated expectations,
for instance). In other words, such spreads must be valuable in expected terms. How can
this be? Obviously, by Jensen’s inequality, the waiting value is a convex function of
the political slantp. (For the analogous reason, we might add, one’s utility function is
concave iff one is averse to zero-mean wealth gambles.)
To understand better the shape of the stopping value, it helps to studythe chance
V R(p) that R wins the election called when the political slant equalsp. Clearly, this is
the expectation of the step function indicator thatp(t) lands above1/2 on election day.
One might expect thatV R(p) smooths out this step. The Appendix proves just this:
Lemma 7 (The Win Chance) The chanceV R(p) is convex whenp ≤ 1
2
eaδ + (1− eaδ)b,
and concave whenp ≥ 1
2
eaδ + (1− eaδ)b — and conversely forV L(p).
Intuitively, once the expected election day political slant exceeds1/2, there is diminishing
returns to raisingp any further. Recalling the expression from Lemma 2, the Appendix
proves that concavity therefore begins whenm(p, δ) = e−aδp + (1− e−aδ)b ≥ 1/2.
As seen in Figure 4, the government calls an election when the political slant hits the
stopping barrier̄p(τ). Upon winning, it acquires a new waiting value functionF (p, 0+),
calculated from(3) by taking the limitt ↓ 0. This makes sense because the next election
is so far in the future that the current political support should not matter much. Ipso
facto,F (p, 0+) ≈ F (0+). Indeed, since fast mean reversion pushes all beliefsp within
1% after three years (§3-B), whether one wins big or small has an insignificant impact
on the expected time in power; the margin of victory has a second order impact on the
expected time in power. One can thus well approximate the stopping value byΩ(p) ≈
δ + V (p)F (0+). Sogovernments can act as if they are merely trying to win back a single
fixed term of lengthF (0+). They can, in effect, behave partially myopically, not looking
beyond the next election. Intuitively then,Ω inherits the convex-concave shape of the win
chanceV , and this is numerically true (as seen in Figure 3).
Figure 3 also reveals that the election barrier hitsΩ on its concave portion.
Lemma 8 (Local Concavity) The stopping valueΩ(p) is locally concave at̄p(t).
This is analytically established in the Appendix. The key proof ingredient is that just as
in Dixit (1993),smooth pastingFp(p, t) = Ωp(p) obtains along the stopping barrier — as
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seen in the numerical simulation in Figure 3. Further, the maximization (3) is equivalent
to the solution of the PDE in Proposition 3 with value matching and smooth pasting. We
show that any tangencyFp(p, t) = Ωp(p) with Ω(p) locally convex implies a later higher
tangency with a greater value function.
Because the waiting value is convex and the stopping value concave inp, the differ-
ence of slopesF ip(p̄
i(t), t)−Ωip(p̄i(t)) rises inσ for t < T . To restore the smooth pasting
optimality condition, the barrier must be hit later. In response, both barriers shift out.
Corollary 2 (Barriers and Risk) The barrierp̄R(t) rises andp̄L(t) falls in volatility σ.
The effect of volatility on the expected time in power is ambiguous. The government
behaves like a decision maker with a utility function that is convex and then concave, by
Lemmas 6 and 8. It is thus ambivalent about risk: Neither greaterσ nor a longer election
periodδ (which also raises election risk) has a clear effect on the expected time in power.
B. Analytically-Motivated Numerical Results. We now provide intuitions for the
comparative statics that we cannot prove but have strong numerical support: specifically,
for the campaign periodδ, the mean reversion levelb, and the speeda.
• THE CAMPAIGN PERIOD δ. Whenδ rises bydδ, this lengthens the expected time in
power directly bydδ, which lifts bothΩi andF i. Also, the support drifts longer, affecting
both terms byF ip(p, t)a(b − p)dδ = Ωip(p, t)a(b − p)dδ, equally so by smooth pasting.
The difference is the variance effect. As withσ in Corollary 2, greaterδ elevates election
period uncertainty, thereby raisingF i relative toΩi. Sop̄R(τ) rises and̄pL(τ) falls in δ.
• THE MEAN REVERSIONSPEEDa. Greater speeda is like smallerσ since it lowers
the variance ofp(t), but returns it faster towards the mean reversion levelb. Depending
on whetherb lies above or below1/2, this can help or hurt the expected value.
But for the election barriers we are more definite. Consider a moment past timet at the
stopping barrier̄pR(τ), when the waiting value is falling at rate faster than 1, and stopping
is best. If one considers the standard case when the barrier bracket the mean-reversion
level, p̄R(τ) > b > p̄L(τ), then the waiting value driftAF i rises when the speeda falls,
by (4). Thus, one no longer needs to stop at timet. Sop̄R(τ) rises and̄pL(τ) falls.
• THE MEAN SUPPORTLEVEL b. When the meanb rises, partyR’s winning chance
rises in any election, and thus so does its expected time in power. Clearly,FR then rises.
Since the drift in the waiting valueAFR rises by (4), the barrier̄pR(τ) rises, by the same
reasoning as with the mean reversion speeda. The opposite results hold for partyL.
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5 POLLS: THEORY, DATA, AND ESTIMATION
A. Theory. Politicians enjoy a variety of ways to take the pulse of the electorate —
many quite qualitative. We assume that governments time their elections using monthly
voting intention polls. These survey individuals planning to vote asking whom they would
pick if an election were called that day. They are noisy observations of the true political
supportp(t). But as the government consists of citizens privy to the information process
ξ(t), our model in principle affords no role for polls. We therefore venture a story with
a mild boundedly rational flavor. Imagine that individuals cannot operate Bayes rule, but
nonetheless know whom they should vote for. This is a simple binary decision, and re-
quires far less introspection than the production of a probability by a method that they
may employ but not understand.13 Governments can then learn from polls, because these
record voting preferences, summarizing otherwise unavailable information. By Lemma 4,
one can view the political slant as the support process for partyR. Also, from Proposi-
tion 1, equation (1) is the law of motion for the support for partyR. We next deal with
poll noise.
In a given time-t poll with sample sizeN , let π(t) = p(t) + η(t) be the proportion
of B-votersthat supportR. As is well-known, the poll errorη obeys at-distribution,
with varianceσ2η(π) ≡ π(1 − π)/N , and so is asymptotically normal. Hence,η behaves
approximately likeσηε, whereε is a mean 0 and variance 1 normal r.v.
Let us denote the polling times by{tj}. Since the polling error does not depend on
the gap∆j ≡ tj+1 − tj between polls, its dynamic effect increases in the poll frequency.
Lemma 9 (Poll Dynamics) The polling process is approximately:
π(tj+1)− π(tj) ≈ a(b− π(tj))∆j + σ̂(π(tj), N∆j)π(tj)(1− π(tj))
√
∆jεj (5)
whereεj∼N(0, 1) andσ̂(π,N∆)>σ is falling in N∆, with limN∆↑∞ σ̂(π, N∆)=σ.
Lemma 9 (proof in Appendix) exploits the fortuitous fact that the varianceσ2η(π)
shares the nonlinear formp(1−p) of the volatility ofp(t). With this addition of noise, we
13Two other non-behavioral stories present themselves. First, polls may be relevant because there exist
some “noise voters” — those who vote in a random fashion, uninfluenced by the political slant. How-
ever, given this additional layer of noise, the support behaves approximately like the political slant. Polls
are then useful as they record the actual voting intentions, and follow the law of motion that we identify
in (5). Second, and more subtly, we may diverge from the informational representative agent, and assume
heterogeneously-informed agents. In aggregate, the voting intentions again obey approximately the same
law of motion as the political slant, and (5) still applies. The complexity of neither approach is justified.
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have derived the polling process law of motion. In other words, the polling process (5)
consists of discrete time snapshots of a noisier political slant process — thecompletely
facetiouscontinuous-time processπ(t).14
Even though the best way to predict election outcomes is to exploit the polling process,
this does not mean that today’s polling result is sufficient for future elections — nor is it
even a best forecast, since the electoral process mean reverts:15 A government riding high
in the polls indeed believes that its trend is most likely down,16 with mean reversion.
Lemma 9 implies that the PDE(4), for the pollπ with polling sample sizeN and time
difference∆, is given byAF (π, t) = Ft + Fπa(b − π) + 12Fππσ̂2(π, N∆)π2(1 − π)2.
Along with Proposition 3, this gives the optimal election barriers in(π, t)-space when we
use any constant approximation forσ̂2(π,N∆), as we estimate below in subsectionC.
B. Polling History and Data. Our data set from the United Kingdom (the ‘British’)
consists of two poll time series of voting intentions dating from June 1943 – May 2005.17
The sample sizes are large, mostly between 1000–1500. The first poll time series are
Gallup polls from June 1943 to May 2001, after which they were discontinued. In 1997,
it shifted from face-to-face interviews to telephone surveys. The second time series, the
MORI Political Monitor (mori.com) spans August 1979 – May 2005 and its sample size
varies from 500 to 17,000. We average any same-day polling results of Gallup and MORI.
We first calculate the realized values ofπ, i.e., the Tory polling support among the
B-voters, excluding small parties. Figure 5 depicts the poll levelsπ from June 1943 –
May 2005. The polls on average have favored Labour — the average poll being 0.46.
C. Estimating the Polling Process. In our empirical analysis, we wish to explain the
variation of governments’ election decisions. To answer this question, we work in the
political support space (π for R and1 − π for L), comparing theoretical and realized
political support levels at the times of election calls. Before this analysis, we estimate the
model parameters from the historical polling data. The poll history can be understood as
the sample data, and the support levels as the out of sample data, since the comparison
between the model and actual support levels is done by using the parameter estimates.
14In finance theory, prices may be modeled as if in continuous-time, despite discrete time observations.
This corresponds to a process with a certain fixed elapse time, such as∆ = 1.
15Kou and Sobel (2004) find that election financial markets better predict election outcomes than polls.
16This is consistent with Smith (2003), who finds that when calling an early election, one experiences a
decline in one’s popular support relative to pre-announcement levels.
17Since polls ask “If there were a general election tomorrow, which party would you vote for?”, we
assume that each is simply a noisy observation of the actual election outcome that would have obtained that

















































Figure 5:Proportion of Tory B-voters, 6/1943–5/2005.The polling processπ has averaged
0.46 (i.e. left-leaning), and ranged from 0.23 to 0.67. Elections are the dashed lines.
Equation (5) is an autoregressive model.18 The parametersa, b, as well as the standard
deviationsσ, ση, are estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS), as follows. Transform
the dependent variable of (5) intoYj = (π(tj+1)− π(tj))/[π(tj)(1− π(tj))
√
∆j] and its
explanatory variables intoXj =
√
∆j/[π(tj)(1 − π(tj))] andZj = −
√
∆j/[1 − π(tj)].
We estimate parametersa andb in (5) from the regression:19
Yj = (ab)Xj + aZj + σ̂εj
Next, defineVj = (Yj − (ab)Xj − aZj)2. The polling error affects the polling process.
Since the polling frequency peaks during the last weeks before the election, so does the
volatility. As σ̂ =
√
σ2 + σ2η/∆j =
√
σ2 + σ2ηdj, wheredj = 1/∆j, we then estimate
Vj = σ
2 + σ2ηdj + ςej,
where{εj}, {ej} are standard normal iidrv’s. For simplicity, we assumeση is constant.20
Table 1 summarizes the estimated process with four parameter sets: overall, outside
and inside theδ-period, and inside theδ-period without three no-choice governments that
18Sanders (2003) shows that such an autoregressive model gives accurate forecasts for the U.K. polls.
19The delta-method (see e.g. Casella and Berger, 2002) gives the standard deviation ofb, σ, andση.
20According to(8) and our data set, this is justified since about 97% ofπ values lie in[0.3, 0.7], which
imply that
√
π(1− π) ∈ [0.46, 0.50]. By (8) and assumingN ≈ 1000, ση =
√
k(π)/(Nπ(1− π)) ≈√
1/500/(π(1− π)) which is between[0.126, 0.137], i.e., close to our estimate (0.12).
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Table 1:The Estimated Polling Parameters.The ‘overall model’ uses all the data; the pre-
δ-period uses data before the election time is announced; theδ-period uses data after the election is
announced. The firstR2 is for theY regression and the second for theV regression. All parameters
are significant. (The label “no short” refers to the absence of the no-choice governments.)
δ-period R2 : 3.61%, 3.30%
a b σ ση
estimate 6.43 0.52 0.80 0.11
st. dev. 3.32 0.04 0.66 0.03
δ-period (no short) R2 : 3.56%, 3.06%
a b σ ση
estimate 6.39 0.52 0.82 0.10
st. dev. 3.62 0.05 0.73 0.03
Pre-δ R2 : 2.61%, 26.43%
a b σ ση
estimate 1.49 0.46 0.27 0.12
st. dev. 0.29 0.02 0.10 0.00
Overall R2 : 2.12%, 11.12%
a b σ ση
estimate 1.59 0.47 0.35 0.12
standard deviation 0.33 0.02 0.16 0.01
were called early due to the lack of clear majority (see§6.1).21
The parameters are not significantly different outside and inside theδ-period.22 As the
t-statistics ofa andb are 4.85 and 27.29, they significantly differ from 0. As expected,
the mean poll levelb is near the averageB-poll level in Figure 5. Thet-statistics ofσ and
ση are 2.23 and 23.40, and thus significant.23 The average polling time difference outside
theδ-period is 0.059 years (about 22 days) and its standard deviation is 0.043 (about 16
days). The numbers inside theδ-period are 0.022 years (about 8 days) and 0.024 (about 9
days).24 So the average poll volatilities are different inside and outside theδ-p riod. But
this difference owes to the greater poll frequency — i.e. smaller elapse time∆ b tween
polls — inside than outside theδ-period. So we assumea, b, σ, andση constant.
We assume that the ruling party understands that the volatility during theδ-period is
not higher than outside it.25 We then calculate the constant volatility from the polling time
differences over the entire data set (average: 0.056 years≈ 21 days, standard deviation:
0.054≈ 20 days). This gives that the constant volatility is0.89.
21TheseR2 levels may seem low, but are very good by comparison to the best empirical work in financial
time series (see, eg., Table 3 in Campbell and Thompson (2005)).
22The t-statistic for the test thata coincides outside and inside theδ-period (without no-choice govern-
ments) is 1.48 (1.35). The analogoust- tatistics forb, σ, andση are 1.34 (1.11), 0.79 (0.75), and−0.33
(−0.67). The joint hypothesis that parameters don’t change cannot be rejected at the 1% significance level.
23For an internal consistency check, our estimateση = 0.12 in Table 1 is near a direct computation
of the standard deviation using ourt-distribution formula in (8):σ2η = 2/[Nπ(tj)(1 − π(tj))] ≈ 1/125,
assumingN ≈ 1000 andπ(tj) ≈ 1/2, so thatση ≈ 0.09. Further, the standard deviation of the polls equals√




2 ≈ 2%. This is consistent with Sanders (2003).
24We are able to reject the null hypothesis that the average polling time differences are equal inside and
outside theδ-period with a 1% level of significance.
25The volatility estimates inside and outside theδ-period areσ̂i = 1.48 and σ̂o = 0.77. These give
R2 = 34% in the regression analysis (without the no-choice governments) in§6.2; further, the average
ruling periods forL andR in §7 are 34 years and 15 years.
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6 ACTUAL VERSUS OPTIMAL ELECTION TIMING
6.1 Election History and Outcomes
The Prime Minister chooses when to call an election by asking the Queen to dissolve
parliament. She then issues a Royal Proclamation for writs to be sent out for a new
parliament, starting the election timetable. According to the Parliament Act of 1911, the
election must be called withinT = 5 years. This has been extended twice — during the
World Wars, just after which our data set starts. The election timetable lasts eighteen days,
plus weekends and public holidays. It starts with the dissolution of Parliament and the
issue of writs on day 0, and ends on day 17, election day (a Thursday, since 1935). While
election season starts with the dissolution, one may extend this period by announcing an
election before dissolution, as has been done just once.26 Table 2 lists the outcomes of 17
British elections from 1945–2005. While the delay time ranges from 21–45 days, we set
δ to the average delay time 33 days (or0.09 years).
The U.K. employs the standard “first-past-the-post” electoral system. There are now
646 seats in the House of Commons, so that a party must win 324 for an overall majority.
But our theory assumes that when calling an election, the governmentacts as if it must
win the popular vote. This almost holds in this data set. In October 1951, the Tories
formed the government but lost the popular vote by 0.8%. In February 1974, the reverse
occurred: Labour formed the government, but trailed the popular vote by 0.8%. The errors
above are small and of opposite parity, and so this is not inconsistent with our assumption.
We see that on average, governments have called elections after 3.65 years in our
data set. There are three unusually short governments: 2/23/50 – 10/25/51 (609 days),
10/15/64 – 3/31/66 (532 days), and 2/28/74 – 10/10/74 (224 days). Excluding these, the
average lifespan has been 4.23 years. In 1951, the Labour government of Clement Attlee
called an election only twenty months into his term, forced by a razor thin majority of
just five MPs. For this was deemed insufficient to sustain his radical program creating the
welfare state that was started with the large majority that Labour enjoyed from 1945–50.
Attlee lost the election to Churchill, ushering in 13 years of Tory rule. A Labour election
in 1966 after two years, given a slimmer majority of four, led to a win. Finally, beset by a
minority government, Labour held and won an election after just seven months in 1974.27
26In 1997, John Major announced the election on March 17 but did not dissolve parliament until April 8.
As he wasbehind in the pollsand just weeks away from the terminal date, this is one case where a longer
campaign period is actually desired, notwithstanding the comparative static forδ in §4.2.
27The 1979 election was also forced by losing a nonconfidence vote (by just one vote). Since it was just
four months before the legal term expired, we do not isolate this election.
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Table 2: United Kingdom Election Results, 1945–2005.Tory and Labour columns are
the vote percentage (seats percentage) for the two main parties. The(π, t) columns lists the poll
level π and the timet from the last election at the time election was announced. The starred
elections were called because of weak governments, and thus not completely free choice variables.
Our theory cannot possibly explain such ‘no-choice’ elections.
Election date AnnouncedWinner Tory Labour (π, t)
7/5/45 5/23/45 Labour 39.8 (33.3) 47.8 (61.4)
2/23/50 1/11/50 Labour 43.5 (47.8) 46.1 (50.4) (0.52,4.52)
10/25/51* 9/19/51 Tory 48.0 (51.3) 48.8 (47.2) (0.57,1.57)
5/26/55 4/15/55 Tory 49.7 (54.8) 46.4 (44.0) (0.51,3.47)
10/8/59 9/8/59 Tory 49.4 (57.9) 43.8 (41.0) (0.54,4.29)
10/15/64 9/15/64 Labour 43.4 (48.3) 44.1 (50.3) (0.49,4.94)
3/31/66* 2/28/66 Labour 41.9 (40.2) 47.9 (57.6) (0.46,1.37)
6/18/70 5/18/70 Tory 46.4 (52.4) 43.0 (45.6) (0.46,4.13)
2/28/74 2/7/74 Labour 37.9 (46.8) 37.1 (47.4) (0.48,3.64)
10/10/74* 9/18/74 Labour 35.8 (43.6) 39.2 (50.2) (0.44,0.55)
5/3/79* 3/29/79 Tory 43.9 (53.4) 36.9 (42.4) (0.54,4.47)
6/9/83 5/9/83 Tory 42.4 (61.1) 27.6 (32.2) (0.61,4.02)
6/11/87 5/11/87 Tory 42.2 (57.9) 30.8 (35.2) (0.58,3.92)
4/9/92 3/11/92 Tory 41.9 (51.6) 34.4 (41.6) (0.49,4.75)
5/1/97 3/17/97 Labour 30.7 (25.0) 43.2 (63.4) (0.37,4.94)
6/7/01 5/8/01 Labour 31.7 (25.2) 40.7 (62.5) (0.36,4.02)
5/5/05 4/5/05 Labour 32.3 (30.5) 35.2 (55.0) (0.46,3.83)
6.2 Election Timing
Next we analyze election timing for the overall parameters in Table 1. As Proposition 3
applies to a finite time horizon stopping exercise of a complex underlying process(1),
only a numerical solution is possible. Appendix B describes our numerical method. The
election time is the first hitting time of the polling process. Since the elections are trig-
gered inπ space, we analyze the election times by comparing pollsπ when elections are
called and the theoretical barrier polls computed from the estimated process parameters.
To distinguish between the optimal Labour and Tory election strategies, we draw the
optimal barriers as a function of the polling support of each party: namely,π for Tories
and1−π for Labour. As seen in Figure 6 and proved in Corollary 1, these barriers fall over
time, first gradually and then steeply tending to 0.5 in the last few months of the term. But
the Tory barrier is globally nearer 0.5 as the polling process favors Labour (= 0.47), and
thus Tories optimally call elections at lower support levels. The average distance between














Figure 6:Election Barriers for Tories (solid line) and Labour (dashed line).According
to our model a ruling party should call election when the support hits its barrier. Circles are support
levels when the Tories called elections. Triangles are poll levels when Labour government did not
have clear majority. Squares are poll levels corresponding to other Labour election times. On
average, the barriers forL andR are 0.64 and 0.63, respectively.
the no-choice Labour governments. These numbers are 11.0% for Labour (7.9% without
the no-choice governments) and 6.7% for Tory. The Tory election calls have evidently
been closer to the optimal policy. This might afford insight into why the Tories have led
the polls about 33% of the time from 1945–2005, but have ruled about 58% of the time.28
Using the polling process path before the elections, we can check how the actual
election times diverged from our theoretical predictions. While most elections were called
early, just two were more than a month late: Thatcher should have called the 1983 election
eleven months earlier, immediately after her triumph in the March–June 1982 Falklands
War. But it might have been deemed opportunistic to take advantage of this patriotic
upsurge — a fact that our model cannot possibly take into account. Likewise, Blair should
have called the election of 2001 eight months earlier.
The above discussion might suggest comparing the model and realized election indi-
cators through time. Call the election indicator 0 before the next election is called, and 1
on the day the election is called. The model indicator is 0 if the political support falls be-
low the ruling party’s election barrier, and otherwise 1. Comparing the indicators by using
all sixteen elections up to their announcement times, we find that the indicators coincide
28With only eight data points for each party, the distances from the barriers corresponding toL andR in
Figure 6 are not significantly different. Further, as will be discussed in§7, the ruling time difference is not
statistically significant. Thus, good luck might explain the ruling time difference just as well.
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92.4% of the time. One might think that this means that ours is close to the true model.
But all models that call elections late will perform well by this simple measure, simply
because the realized indicator equals 0 most of the time. To avoid this problem, we next
focus only on the election announcement times (when the realized indicator equals 1),
and analyze how well our model explains the those support levels.
The regression models in Figure 7 illustrate our support level analysis at the elec-
tion announcement times. The dependent variableY is the realized support level and
the explanatory variableX is the theoretical barrier value at the election announcement
time. This analysis is motivated by cross-sectional asset pricing tests (see e.g. Cochrane,
1996). No-choice governments aside, we find thatY = −0.49 + 1.76X. This intercept
is insignificant, and the slope significant. SinceR2 = 43%, our model clearly explains
a large portion in the variation of election times through the regression. Put differently,
the correlation of the theoretical and realized support levels at the election times is 0.65.
At the very least,we have correctly identified the pollsπ and elapse timet as important
decision factors29 (and below we consider a completely naive linear approach usingπ, t).
If the elections were called solely using our model with the estimated parameters,
then the regression line should coincide with the diagonalY = X. As the intercept
of the choice governments is insignificant, Figure 7 also includes the best zero-intercept
regression,Y = 0.90X. Thet-statistic on this slope is now 32.25 andR2 = 33%. This
regression agrees with the message of Figure 6, that the model barriers exceed the realized
support levels. The average forecast is correct if we scale the barriers down by 0.9. But
we must reject the null hypothesis of a unit slope, since thet-statistic is 3.58.30
The slope test is obviously a joint test on the model and its parameters. To ensure
a unified paper built on our fleshed-out theory, we have consistently employed an ex-
tremely conservative econometric exercise — for instance, assuming constancy over the
time period 1945–2005 (see§7), and introducing no other explanatory factors (see the
conclusion). Any additional degrees of freedom would surely have improved the fit.31
Further testing the result, we regressed the residuals of the regressions without the
no-choice governments on the realized election time, the election year, and the incumbent
29But as seen in Figure 7, our model fares poorly if the no-choice governments are also included. As
argued, ours is not a theory of when minority or bare majority governments call elections.
30We would likewise reject an extremely good model with slope, say, 1.01 andR2 = 100%, for then the
slope would have zero standard deviation. In other words, we reject the slope test partly due to our highR2.
31By the same token, tests on the Black and Scholes model with historical volatility fail in many option
markets, and so in practice the model is used with the so-called implied volatility that is estimated from
option prices. By§4.2 and the regressionY = 0.90X, in our model the corresponding implied parameters
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Figure 7: Actual and Theoretical Poll Support at Election Calls. The triangles are
the elections that Labour called early due to slim majority or minority governments (10/25/51,
3/31/66, and 10/10/74). The squares are all other Labour election announcement support levels.
The circles are the election announcement Tory support levels. In the regressionsY = actual
support level,X = model support level, and the parameter standard deviations are parenthesized.
The solid line is without the no-choice (“short”) governments, the dot-dash line is without the
no-choice governments and without the intercept, and the dashed line is with all the governments.
party. Do these effects matter? The coefficients were insignificant: Allt-statistics were
less than 0.9,R2 = 9% with the intercept, andR2 = 13% with no intercept. So neither the
party, the election year, nor the elapse time offer any further significant predictive power.
Our contribution rests on our derivation of a rationally-founded nonlinear stopping
barrier, just as with American options in the stock market. But finally,might a simpler
naive model have done better?How important is the nonlinearity? To this end, we tossed
aside the theory, and re-ran the regressions in Figure 7 assuming that election times can be
linearly explained (via OLS) using only the elapse time from the last election. This gives
the regressionY = 0.85−0.08t without the no-choice governments, whereY is the actual
support level. Both parameters are significant, theirt-statistics are5.3 and−2.1. But the
R2 of this regression drops to28% (and just 2% with all governments). So our optimizing
nonlinear model is not only rationally justified, but also better explains the variation in the
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Figure 8: Expected Time in Power Given Initial Support Levels. The top graph now
depicts the expected time in power for Labour (at left, forπ < 0.5) and Tory (at right, forπ > 0.5),
as the initial poll varies. The middle graphs assume that the election cannot be called within three
years, as is protocol in the U.K. for majority governments. The bottom graphs finally assume that
elections are called every four years. The value of this timing option is seen to be substantial.
7 THE OPTION VALUE OF ELECTION TIMING
The option to freely time an election increases the expected time in power — because the
incumbent can always ignore the option and hold elections at their term’s end. We now
measure the value of having optimal electoral timing. Figure 8 illustrates the expected
times in powerFL(π, 0) andFR(π, 0) as a function of the initial polling processπ (i.e.
the last election outcome). Integrating these expected times over the long-run polling
density in Lemma 3 reveals the average worth of these options. We weight these expec-
tations using the derived (lower variance) political slant processp(t) in Table 3 (see also
Figure 1), since we are taking the perspective of the true driving process. In other words,
we use the process parameters in Table 1 withση = 0, as there is no polling error withp.
The predicted times are quite high, by historical standards32 — almost 68 years for
Labour, and over 24 for Tory. While it is true that parties have diverged from our optimal
exercise rule, one might imagine a lesser cost of this suboptimal behavior. For this reason,
we have explored various alternative explanations. Firstly, barring a weak government,
elections have never been called within the first three years of a term. Governments might
well fear punishment for opportunism.33 We thus reformulated our timing exercise, asking
32The average historical ruling period (standard deviation) for all governments is 8.6 years (5.1 years),
for Labour 6.3 years (1.2 years), and for Tory 11.6 years (7.3 years). Between 7/5/1945-5/5/2005, there has
been only 7 ruling periods. Clearly, the average ruling periods are not significantly different.
33For instance, Blaiset al (2004) argue that voters punished Jean Chretien for calling a snap election in
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Table 3:Expected Time in Power.Under different regime assumptions, we compute(a) the
long-run fraction of time in power, and(b) the expected time in power conditional on have just
been elected. The starred rows use the polling process that obtained until 1992.
flexible timing 0–5 yrs L rules 87.6% of time L rules 65.8 yrs R rules 24.4 yrs
flexible timing 0–5 yrs * L rules 74.4% of time L rules 51.9 yrs R rules 34.3 yrs
flexible timing 3–5 yrs L rules 84.6% of time L rules 36.0 yrs R rules 17.1 yrs
flexible timing 3–5 yrs* L rules 72.5% of time L rules 31.9 yrs R rules 23.2 yrs
elections every 5 years L rules 79.2% of time L rules 12.5 yrs R rules 8.6 yrs
elections every 4 years L rules 79.2% of time L rules 10.1 yrs R rules 6.9 yrs
elections every 4 years* L rules 69.1% of time L rules 8.9 yrs R rules 7.6 yrs
that elections be called in years 3–5; this eliminates repeatedly calling an election when
riding high in the polls, and lessens the expected time in power, as we see in Table 3.34
Secondly, we have discovered that the pollsπ averaged 0.49 from 1943–92, but just
0.37 in 1992–2005. Thet-statistics for the difference of these average values equals
32.48, and is obviously significant. The year 1992 may seem arbitrary, but any break
point between 1970–1995 produces an extremely significant difference in the poll meanb.
Of course, we do not model regime shifts, since that would be another topic. But suppose
we use the statistically different parametersa, b, σ̂ for the span before 1992.35 This period
less strongly favors Labour, and sees Labour’s average win chance fall from 75% to 69%.
Indeed, Tories only win for political slantsp > 0.5 > 0.47 = b, the average poll. With
a more favorable process, this tail event happens more often. Consequently, Labour’s
expected time in power falls to 31.9 while Tory’s rises to 23.2.
Assume now that elections by protocol are called in the 3–5 year window, and use the
overall polling process parameters in Table 1. In that event, if the U.K. implemented a
fixed electoral cycle with four year terms, then the expected duration in power — given
an optimal policy — would fall by a factor of more than two: from 36 to 10.1 years
for Labour, and 17.1 to 6.9 years for Tory. Labour’s expected percentage time in power
would drop slightly from 84.6% to 79.2%.An overarching observation here is that flexible
electoral timing favors the dominant party far more than does fixed election cycles.
One may also be interested in a simple welfare analysis: Does endogenous timing on
average help or hurt the voters? We can intuitively conclude the former, since the political
November 2000 after just three years and four months.
34This does not greatly move our stopping barriers, and the resulting regression for past elections without
the no-choice governments is only a slightly worse fit, withR2 = 39%.
35Specifically,a = 2.2, b = 0.49, σ = 0.19, ση = 0.11, constant volatilityσ̂ = 0.69. That is, theπ
process mean reverts faster about a higher mean, with less volatility.
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slant process is Markovian and independent of the ruling party and its actions. Consider
two cases: an early or a late election. The ruling party optimally calls the election early
only if its support is high. This choice is welfare-neutral for the voters, since the best
party is already in power. On the other hand, the ruling party might not call an election
early if its support is low. Here, the wrong party stays in power, and the voters are hurt.
8 CONCLUSION
Summary. Optimal timing of votes and elections is an important subject, and the periodic
topic of great media speculation in some countries. We have sought to demystify this
exercise for all concerned, by asking whether governments might simply be solving for
the time maximizing strategies with flexible electoral timing. What we have done takes
inspiration from the financial theory of options.
We have designed and analyzed a tractable model capturing the informational richness
of the political economy setting: namely, a forward-looking optimizing exercise using an
informationally-derived mean-reverting polling process. The optimal election time in this
framework is the first moment the polling process hits a nonlinear stopping barrier. We
believe that this is a substantively novel optimal timing exercise for economics (see Dixit
and Pindyck, 1994). Its execution is also quite unlike other optimal stopping exercises in
economics and finance, because the party in power holds sequential finite time horizon
American options and because there is a delay in the exercise decisions. Each difficulty
presented special hurdles. We pushed the analysis as far as possible, deriving the timing
comparative statics and the convex-concave shape of the value function. We derived the
comparative statics by indirect means, without recourse to closed forms. The optimization
was done by numerical means, as happens for finite time horizon American put options.
We then fit the polling process to the post-war Labour-Tory rivalry of the U.K. We
found a high correlation between the realized political support levels and the model sup-
port levels at the election call dates. The weak governments aside, parties in power do
indeed try to maximize their expected time in power, and election times are triggered by
the polls and the time from the last election. We also show that the value of the option to
choose the election time can be very substantial, and favors the dominant party.
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Some Caveats. As usual, our tractability owes to some simplifying assumptions.36 The
first and foremost difficulty we avoid concerns the size of a win. We sidestep compli-
cations of minority or slim majority government, but in our regression, we do identify
three elections well-understood to have resulted from weak governments. Obviously, no
maximizing theory can be expected to explain something that is not a choice.
A minority government is less desirable for the winner, since it must compromise its
preferred governing choices to satisfy its coalition partners.37 Such a government is more
fragile, and may struggle maintaining its winning margin with each vote. Also, a small
majority may erode with the passage of time.38 We are very upfront about this weakness,
but it would clearly entail writing a different paper. A more involved model might as-
sume higher flow payoffs to governing with a strong than a weak majority or minority
government, and lead to early elections called with minority of weak governments.
The second key simplification we make is to ignore the quirks of the ‘first-past-the-
post’ voting system, that the vote winner might not win the election. In the U.K., this has
not proved critical,39 and is a justified simplification with little impact.
Third, our objective function of the decision makers is quite straightforward, positing
that governments only maximize their expected time in power. We have crucially rendered
this a decision-theoretic exercise, assuming that the government is unable to affect the
course of the political slant. Namely, it takes the polling process as given. Like all other
simplifications, we do not in any way claim their irrelevance; however, they are best
studied elsewhere (eg. Austen-Smith and Banks (1988) deal with the richer picture). Our
single-minded theory explains much of the variation in election timing decisions with just
two factors: polls and elapse time.
The objective function might be modified to incorporate different restrictions — such
as certain dates when the elections must be called. This would lower stopping barriers
(thereby improving the model fit) as support may be lost before the next open date.
Personal and party interests may conflict. A retiring Prime Minister may wish to
36We have also ignored any strategic incentives to vote, but these are surely quite miniscule in a national
election (see eg. Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996)). As noted, we also assume that voters simply myopi-
cally vote for the best current party, and do not anticipate the scandals or laurels to come. Ours is a theory
of strategizing and forward-looking behavior by the government, and not voters.
37The Tories won in 1951 with a minority of seats, but formed a solid working alliance with the National
Liberals. The 1974 Labour government began as a razor slim majority that soon evaporated into a minority
government; from March 1977 to August 1978, it was sustained in the ‘Lib-Lab Pact’ (with the Liberals).
38Even John Major’s 21 seat majority in 1992 slowly shrunk throughout his term, as many government
ministers lost their seats. By the 1997 election, it was almost a minority government.
39We did not use Canadian data in our main empirical analysis because the strong geographic concentra-
tion of the major parties produces a systematic divergence between the vote and election count winners.
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prolong his time in power, delaying the election past its best date. Discounting — a year
now is worth more than one later — may seem reasonable, but we have no prior reason to
choose any particular discount factor. Moreover, any impatience delays elections, because
the utility from the future terms falls. In light of Figure 6, this worsens the model fit.
Fourthly, we assume constant parameters over 1945–2005. The parameters naturally
change over this time span (see§7), and relaxing it would improve the model fit.
Finally, we posit that all decision-making depends on the polls and elapse time. In fact,
the government surely has more accurate information, possibly from private polls, etc.
This raises the polling sample size, and lowers the polling volatility and so the election
barriers. Furthermore, the government must then engage in a filtering exercise, producing
a posterior belief process with smaller variance thanπ. We have avoided this highly
nontrivial exercise, but have verified that our model implications about electoral timing
are reasonably robust to the variance specification. The normative predictions of the
model — the expected durations in power — are sensitive to the variance specification.
These limitations of our theory notwithstanding, we capture the central element of
this crucial timing decision of a parliamentary democracy. Attesting to this, our empirical
analysis explains a significant proportion of the variation in the election timing decisions.
A OMITTED PROOFS
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1: Variance of the Political Slant Process
We claim
p(t) = m(p, t) + σ
∫ t
0
e−a(t−s)p(s)(1− p(s))dW (s), (6)
wherem(p, t) = e−atp+(1−e−at)b is the expected time-t posteriorE[p(t)|p(0) = p]. To
derive (6) and them(p, t) formula, differentiate (6). This gives (1), after manipulating:
dp(t) = a
[





The variance ofp(t) is thusv(t) = σ2
∫ t
0




e−2a(t−s) {m2(s)(1−m(s))2 + [1− 6m(s)(1−m(s))] v(s) + 3(v(s))2} ds,
29









e−2a(t−s) [1 + 6 (v(s)−m(s)(1−m(s)))] vσ2(s)ds,
vσ2t(t) = σ
−2 [vt(t) + 2av(t)] + σ2 [1 + 6 {v(t)−m(t)(1−m(t))} − 2a] vσ2(t)
= E[p2(t)(1− p(t))2] + σ2 [1 + 6 {v(t)−m(t)(1−m(t))} − 2a] vσ2(t).
We find vt(0) > 0 andvσ2(0) > 0 for all σ2 > 0 andt ≥ 0. Now vσ2(t) = vσ2(0) +∫ t
0
vσ2t(y)dy. If vσ2(t) = 0 for somet > 0, thenvσ2t(t) > 0. Thus,vσ2(t + ε) > 0, where
ε > 0 is small, and we get that the variance ofp(t) rises in the diffusion coefficientσ.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 3: Derivation of the Stationary Density
We appeal to Karlin and Taylor (1981, pages 220 and 241). Ifdp(t) = µ(p)dp + σ(p)dW
has a stationary densityψ(y) = lim
t→∞
(∂/∂y)P (p(t) ≤ y|p(0) = x), then it obeys the
stationary forward Fokker-Plank equation1
2
[σ(p)ψ(p)]′′ − [µ(p)ψ(p)]′ = 0. In particular,
for (1), we have:1
2
[(σp(1 − p))2ψ(p)]′′ − [a(b − p)ψ(p)]′ = 0. Its solution is given by





























wherep0 ∈ (0, 1) is arbitrary, andC0, C1 andC2 are constants.
Claim 1 (Entrance boundary) The extremes 0 and 1 are entrance boundaries, i.e., they
cannot be reached from(0, 1) but the process can begin from the boundaries.
Proof: We consider the left boundary; the right is similarly analyzed usingp̄(t) = 1−p(t)
and notingdp̄(t) = a ((1− b)− p̄(t)) dt−σp̄(t)(1−p̄(t))dW (t) andp(t) = 1 iff p̄(t) = 0.




s(z)dz = ∞ andlimy↓0
∫ p
y
m(z)dz < ∞, wherep ∈ (0, 1). The
first condition holds since
∫ p
0
s(z)dz ≥ ∫ p
0
exp(c0 + c1/z)z
c2dz = ∞ for all p ∈ (0, 1),
wherec0, c1, andc2 are positive constants. Likewise, we get the second condition.¤
Note thatS(p) is monotonic. Claim 1 givesS(0) = −∞ andS(1) = ∞. Therefore,









A.3 Proof of Proposition 2: Existence of Smooth Monotone Values
Before we begin: Even if the government stands at 100% on the day election is an-
nounced, it loses the election with a boundedly positive chance, say at least` > 0. This
yields an upper boundΩi < δ + (T + δ)/`.




0 into (3) to computeF
i
1. Since (2)
and (3) define monotone mapsΥ : F i 7→ Ωi andΦ : Ωi 7→ F i, the iterations obey
0 ≤ Ωi0≤Ωi1≤Ωi2≤· · · and0≤F i0≤F i1≤F i2≤· · · . Their limits exist, and obey (2)–(3).
Furthermore, each of the mapsΥ, Φ preserve monotonicity inp. To see this ofΦ, use
the stopping timeτ ′ optimal forp′ atp′′ > p′. This yields a higher expected stopping value
ΩR(p(τ)) with p′′ than withp′, since the stopping beliefp(τ) is higher, path by path. Once
we optimize forp′′, we therefore find thatFR(t, p′′) > FR(t, p′). Much more simply,Υ
preserves monotonicity, as it involves no optimal stopping exercise. SinceFR(0, q) = 0




ψ(p, q, δ)FR(0, q)dq, for the smooth transition densityψ in p. As
FR is boundedly finite,ΩR is continuous and in fact smooth inp. Similarly with L.
Finally, as a boundedly finite solution to (3),F i is continuous. ¤
A.4 Proof of Lemma 7: The Shape of the Win Chance
If p ≥ 1
2
eaδ +(1−eaδ)b, then the expected election outcome at the end of the delay period
is m(p, δ) > 1
2
. Now, by Lemma 1, increasingσ lifts the variance ofp(δ) and since
volatility can only hurtR (asR will most likely win the election), it makes losing more
likely. Thus,V R(p) is falling in σ for all p ≥ 1
2
eaδ + (1− eaδ)b, and so must be (locally)
concave. Likewise, changing variablesp ← 1 − p, we find thatV L(p) is concave for all
p ≤ 1
2
eaδ + (1− eaδ)b. But V R(p) ≡ 1− V L(p). Altogether, we deduce the convexity of
V R(p) for all p ≤ 1
2
eaδ + (1− eaδ)b andV L(p) for all p ≥ 1
2
eaδ + (1− eaδ)b. ¤
A.5 Proof of Lemma 8: Local Concavity
Claim 2 (Convexity at the Barrier) F ipp(p̄
i, t) ≥ Ωipp(p̄i) for all t < T .
Proof: We consider onlyR. From Lemma 6 and Proposition 3,FR(p, t) − ΩR(p) ≥ 0
andFRp (p̄
R, t)− ΩRp (p̄R) = 0. Clearly,FR(p̄R, t)− ΩR(p̄R) is convex. ¤
Let pl be the optimal barrier att, so thatp̄R(t) = pl. By Proposition 3, it obeys
the value matching and smooth pasting optimality conditionsΩR(pl) = FR(pl, t) and
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ΩRp (pl) = F
R
p (pl, t) ≥ 0, wherep̄R(t) = pl. For a contradiction, assume thatΩR(p) is





ΩRpp(y)dy, if there existsph > pl
with ΩRp (ph) = Ω
R
p (pl), thenΩ
R must be locally concave at the smallest suchph > pl.
Assume thatph exists and select the smallestph > pl.
We show that this gives a contradiction: FixΩR, and defineF̂R by value matching
and smooth pasting atph, and the PDE in Proposition 3 — which is equivalent to the
maximization (3). SincêFRp (p, t) < F̂
R
p (ph, t) = Ω
R
p (ph) ≤ ΩRp (p) on [pl, ph], we have








ΩRp (p) = Ω(pl)
If ph ≤ 1 does not exist then the maximization (3) produces a higher waiting valueF̂R
with p̄R(t) = 1. By Claim 1, this means the election is not called att < T . ¤
A.6 Proof of Lemma 9: The Polling Process
Denoteπj ≡ π(tj), etc. Letηj = eηj
√
πj(1− πj)/N(1 + o(1)) be the polling error
for B-voters, whereo(1) vanishes asN → ∞, and{eηj} are iid standard normal r.v.’s
independent of the{W (t)}. Since the polling error and the political slant process are
unobserved, they are random variables even though the poll outcome is known. Write the
discrete-time poll differences asπj+1−πj = (pj+1−pj)+(ηj+1−ηj), whereηj+1−ηj =∫ tj+1
tj
ϕ(t)dW η(t) and whereW η is independent ofW . Hence, for allj ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}:
πj+1 − πj =
∫ tj+1
tj
a(b− p(t))dt + ∫ tj+1
tj
σp(t)(1− p(t))dW (t) + ∫ tj+1
tj
ϕ(t)dW η(t) (7)





j+1|πj] = 1+o(1)N {πj(1− πj)+E[πj+1(1− πj+1) | πj]} = 1+o(1)N kjπj(1−πj),




dW η(t) = ϕj[W
η(tj+1)−W η(tj)] shares the mean and variance ofηj+1 − ηj.
Now we write the discrete-time polling difference (7) as follows:















whereej andξj are iid standard normal variables. This has drifta (b− πj) and variance
Var[πj+1−πj|πj] = a2πj(1−πj) (1+o(1)) ∆2j/N + σ2π2j (1−πj)2∆j + kjπj(1−πj)N 1+o(1)∆2j ,
where the two last terms of the variance owe to the independence ofej andξj. If N is
high and∆j low, then the last terms dominate. Thus,
πj+1 − πj ≈ a(b− πj)∆j + σ̂(πj, N∆j)πj(1− πj)
√
∆jεj,
whereεj is a standard normal variable and
σ̂(π, N∆) =
√
σ2 + k(π)/[N∆π(1− π)] ≡
√
σ2 + σ2η(π)/∆ > σ. (8)
Thus,limN∆↓0 σ̂(π, N∆) = ∞ andlimN∆↑∞ σ̂(π, N∆) = σ. ¤
B THE NUMERICAL OPTIMIZATION METHOD
Our numerical method is as follows (see also Duan and Simonato (2001) and Seydel (2002)):
Step 0 (grid, transition matrix, and initial values).Select the discrete interval∆π
betweenπ values and the discrete time period∆t. These define the grid in(π, t) space
(0, 1)× [0, 5]. Calculate the transition matrixM of π over the discrete time from(5) and
Table 1. SetF 0i (0) = [50 · · · 50]T , whereF ji (t) is thej’th value function (column vector)
for differentπ levels andi ∈ {L,R}. Select the convergence variableχ > 0. Setj = 0.
Step 1 (The value function when an election is called).Calculate the value function at
the end of the five year period:F j+1i (5) = MδF
j
i (0), whereMδ = M
n is the transition






k,j for any fixed pair of nonnegative integers
r ands with r + s = n, andn is the closest integer toδ/∆t. Note thatF j+1i (5) is also the
value function if the election is called before the end of the period, i.e., it modelsΩi.
Step 2 (The Value Function).For eachn ∈ {1, . . . , 5/∆t}, calculate first the waiting
valueF̂ j+1i (5− n∆t) = MF j+1i (5− (n− 1)∆t), and then check the early election:
[F j+1i (5− n∆t)]z = max{[F j+1i (5)]z, [F̂ j+1i (5− n∆t)]z},
for all z ∈ {1, . . . , 1 + 1/∆π}, where[F ]z is thez’th element ofF .
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| [F j+1i (5− n∆t)]z − [F ji (5− n∆t)]z |< χ
then stop. Otherwise setj = j + 1 and go to step 1.
By §A.3, this algorithm converges, andF j+1i approximates the value function on the
grid, by Proposition 3. The grid’s optimal election time is found by:
τ j(z) = inf
{
n ∈ {0, ..., 5/∆t} : [F j+1i (n∆t)]z ≤ [F j+1i (5)]z
}
,
and so it gives the exercise barrier in the grid. The grid’s value function approximates the
true value function as the mesh size increases since then the grid approximates(0, 1)×[0, 5].
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